MARITIMES SPACES Regional maritime policies
Interdependence, solidarity, cooperation Since the 1980s, a number of converging factors have together contributed to giving the maritime a whole new meaning for the region. The collective responsibilities imposed across the whole region by international law (Montego Bay Convention) and the various multinational and transnational stakes involved; now militate strongly in favour of a concerted global approach to these issues... but implementation has run up against clear difficulties. 1. Cooperation: a necessity difficult to bring about1.1. An evident interdependenceThe opportunities and the need for cooperation between coastal states and territories are manifold in multiple domains involving the maritime: the region would clearly benefit from an effective and coherent network of shipping routes (passenger and cargo), a global policy for both medium and long-term conservation of marine resources, as well as measures for the prevention and control of all sources of pollution. All countries are also involved to varying degrees, in the prediction and prevention of natural hazards linked to the sea (integrated warning systems, shared means of response), in the laying of fibre optic, broadband communication cables, oil and gas pipelines, in the fight against cross-border trafficking (illegal migrants, smuggled goods, arms, drugs) across this whole maritime space, as well as against piracy which, whilst not reaching levels found in the Indian Ocean, remain a pre-occupation along the coasts of Colombia, Venezuela and South Haiti.
Source: IMB (International Maritime Bureau)
In other words, here are to be found a number of problems, which require monitoring, and demand at least some coordination, if not collaboration, between the countries of the region, given the large number of small, overlapping national maritime zones. But the obstacles are many. 1.2. Numerous checksThe first and foremost goes far beyond the sphere of just maritime affairs: it stems from the region's colonial history, whose lasting legacy has been the political fragmentation of the region into divided entities, one from the other, each with quasi exclusive links to their respective European metropoles, thereby leaving no historical tradition of collaboration in the area, indeed quite the contrary. The diversity of present-day regimes and political organisation (independent states, associated territories), the multiplicity of cultures, languages, legal systems, the weight of customary traditions, the wide disparities in terms of power, territory, demography and economy, the scant means of many states, hardly helps, facilitate the establishment of a sense of equality and solidarity. More specifically, the varying responses to maritime issues by different states and territories remain a real obstacle to the development of integrated policies in this domain. The degree to which there is any identification with the sea, even the latter's importance in the everyday, such attitudes towards the maritime are hardly likely to be the same in small islands, washed by surrounding seas that constitute the never-changing horizon, as opposed to the large islands where those same waters appear less haunting, less omnipresent. Further removed are the isthmic and mainland states where their centres of demographic and economic activity are not solely Caribbean, but whose geopolitical and geostrategic ambitions, their spheres of interest, stretch across several regions (Pacific Ocean, continental neighbours...). Divergent regional responses with regard to particular problems, the unequal degrees of exposure to risk, lie at the root of an absence of consensus to promote joint solutions. This is well illustrated in the case of rising sea level: small islands, together with a few, low-lying coastal territories (Guyanas) act as a bloc within AOSIS1 in unison with their counterparts in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (but not with their regional neighbours). They seek to make their collective voice heard at a world scale in order to strengthen their campaign against global warming. For all concerned the stakes are high, as the majority of their populations are concentrated in low-lying coastal areas. For those just above sea level, for example the Bahamas or Barbuda, it has even become a question of survival. Everywhere, sea level rise can provoke, often at short notice, the sudden exodus of “climate refugees”... yet these threatened zones still have difficulties in galvanising the support of continental mainland territories where the population is largely concentrated well away from the coast, and which remains less concerned. A third obstacle stems from rivalry and competition between states, seen in the case of tourism where each seeks to attract cruise operators to their exclusive advantage. Accordingly, in the development of maritime links and port infrastructure, national interests as well as those of the transport companies, outweigh a more global view of the region taken as a whole. The lack of disposable means for investment also constitutes a major impediment. Most states have only weakly development financial, technical, human, military resources, and are hardly in a position to promote ambitious projects, or even to ensure compliance with any edits or obligations agreed locally. One does not have to look far to explain the inadequacy of many policies involving regional cooperation. In many cases, the region has to rely on networks, on equipment, on initiatives, which are extra-regional. Forecasting cyclones is within the remit of world organisations or the United States. Maritime transports routes are decided by the main global hubs, and the chosen circuits of cruise liners obey the logic of companies whose headquarters are outside the region, and who take little account of those regional interests and needs. Matters become even more complicated when the respective interests of one or other of the parties do not coincide. In the fight against drug trafficking using sea transport, the United States does not enjoy unanimous support within the region. For certain states, allowing the pursuit of traffickers by foreign warships in their territorial waters, is tantamount to renouncing part of their own sovereignty... without even speaking of the considerable financial stakes linked to the drug industry, whose to the highest political levels. The same differences of attitude are found regarding the protection of whales and dolphins (see below). As such, the establishment of common maritime policies is neither self-evident nor easy to realise. Equally some areas of intervention are more easily adopted then others.
2. Environment: a test area for regional policy2.1. A fragile and dangerous milieuWith few exceptions, the shores of the Caribbean Sea, more open to the wider ocean than its Eurafrican Mediterranean counterpart, are not characterised either by high population densities or by major industrial development (except very intermittently). However, given the scant size of most territories that border the sea, as well as their often-insular character, they do represent vulnerable and ecologically sensitive environments. The economic importance of the sea (tourism being the region's foremost activity), its “standard-bearer” image, and relatively consensual position with regard to environmental preoccupations also combines to strengthen their resonance. The latter consciously favours an imperative obligation to safeguard the sea, the mangroves, the coastline, the coral reefs, and their biodiversity for the interest and amenity of the region's inhabitants.2 Firstly, the sea is threatened by diverse pollutions of marine origin: 1 500 fishing boats are ever present, in addition to 60 000 cargo vessels plying their trade each year, generating more than 80 000 tons of waste. The huge traffic of oil tankers destined for the giant refineries of Texas, Louisiana or the east coast of the United States, highlights in turn the risk of accidents or of dumping oil residue; to which should be added those linked to offshore exploitation of hydrocarbons, as much in Mexico as the United States and Venezuela (the Maracaibo Lagoon). Dangerous cargoes transiting the region also give rise to the threat of an accident or act of terrorism, for example, the Japanese nuclear waste being transhipped via the Panama Canal to France (the treatment centre at La Hague), as well as the reverse movement of re-cycled waste. Coastal and maritime zones are also subject to risks linked to human settlement and activities, even those further removed from the coast: dumping of unfiltered or partially unfiltered water, of heavy metals (lead, copper...), illegal discharges of all types of other waste into open coastal waterways and drainage channels, as well as phyto-sanitary products used in agriculture. As a result, the Mississippi Delta and increasingly extensive surrounding areas of the Gulf of Mexico (around 25 000 km2 in total) are now categorized as part of the so-called “dead zone.”
Equally dangerous is the massive discharge into the sea earth particles: the deposition of mud over the seabed stifles growth of coral formations, and the turbidity of the waters leads to the disappearance through lack of light of all aquatic life. Deforestation and urbanisation, in accelerating both stream turn-off and erosion, serve to exacerbate the situation. It is not by chance that the problem assume such formidable dimensions in Haiti, but very few are the number of countries spared, and in Martinique, for example, the waterborne alluvium of the Lézarde, Rivière-Salée together with a few other water courses, are contributing to the rapid silting-up of the upper reaches of the bay of Fort-de-France. The coastal areas of the Caribbean are suffering from worrying levels of environmental damage, the result of degradation originating from both natural and human causes. The erosion of beaches has become a region-wide problem. Everywhere, they are in retreat, sometimes by several metres per annum (4 m on average in Barbuda, 1 to 3 m in Dominica). The phenomenon is brutally accelerated during the onset of cyclones and heavy sea surges. In 1995, the beach of Coco Point (Barbuda) retreated by 25 m in half a day, following the passage of Hurricane Luis; in Grenada, the most frequented tourist beaches were destroyed by Hurricane Lenny in 1999, with serious economic consequences (Desse M. and Saffache P., 2005). In Dominica, many sandy inlets were drastically affected by cyclone damage where previously there had been excessive removal of materials for the construction industry. The worrying symptoms of the impact on ecosystems are multiplying: diverse marine species threatened by pollution or the destruction of their habitat, are in the process of disappearing, as in the case of the monk seal or the Caribbean Manatee (“sea cow”) of which only a few dispersed specimens remain. All species of turtle remain threatened by hunting, poaching, trawling, and ‘phantom fishing'.3 Other animal and vegetable species are exploited without any real control, and are becoming increasingly rare: corals, shellfish, crustaceans, sea-fish and mammals (and everywhere the mangroves are in retreat). In Guyana, over-exploitation is clearly in evidence: in just a decade, caught red snapper has decreased in size by more than 10 cm, their average weight from 2 kg to 800 g, and the age at capture is now less than that of first maturity. The case of the Queen conch (Strombus gigas) is also symptomatic of the same trend.
Notwithstanding the various it faces, the sea itself can also be a source of danger: it generates and provides a vehicle for hurricanes and their associated phenomena (cyclonic sea surges). The tsunamis, certainly rare and of normally limited amplitude, are viewed as potentially less dangerous, at least as represented in the collective memory (the last destructive catastrophes date back to 1882 for the San Blas isles near Panama, 1918 for Puerto Rico and 1946 for the Dominican Republic). However, the region (albeit with an unequal impact) is more concerned by sea level rise.
2.2. A veritable arsenal of judicial and institutional measuresSince the 1980s, the region has built up a powerful panoply of judicial and institutional measures aimed at conserving and valorising the marine environment. In 1983, a ‘Regional Agreement for the Protection of the Marine Environment,' also known as the “Cartagena Convention,” was signed within the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It was the first of its type in the world, complemented by three special protocols (annexe a). These highly detailed and ambitions ‘frameworks' are the only ones solely concerned with the whole maritime domain of the Caribbean. The ‘Cartagena Convention' has facilitated international cooperation, for example within the RAMSAR4 programmes on the protection of wetlands, or again with the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI). Countries of the Caribbean are also signed-up members of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS), of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, and of the Convention on Biological Diversity. All these conventions advocate and initiate cooperation over a highly diversified domain, which promotes everything from research to data collection, the involvement of civil society, and the putting in place of measures of evaluation and protection. In December 2001, under the aegis of the ACS (Association of Caribbean States), a Convention on Sustainable Tourism Zone of the Caribbean (STZC) was signed. Whilst no specifically “maritime,” a large part relates to the sea and its coastal areas, viewed as an integral whole. Here again, the objective is to favour “a tourist development which remains sensitive to the preservation of a socio-economic and environmental balance.” A major feature of the project resides in the will to promote an integrated regional approach to tourism: the development of a Caribbean ‘brand' of sustainable tourism, a project to ‘package' multi-destination tourism, as a total break from the “each for itself” approach which still prevails today. Examples would include Guadeloupe-Dominica or Trinidad-Venezuela. Good intentions exist and the tools are available... but what specific progress has there been to date?
2.3. Undeniable progressThe major international accords have played a positive role in persuading governments within the region to protect the environment. The number of protected maritime spaces has multiplied, today totalling more than 300 (80% of which are less than 20 years old) across all states, even the smallest and poorest.
Regional, sub-regional an bi-lateral initiatives abound. Saint Lucia has benefitted from Barbados' expertise on coastal protection. Conservation programmes regarding sea-turtles have been launched (with 11 states participating), as well as for the Caribbean ‘sea-cow' (Trichechus manatus), the largest ‘Sirenia' still in existence (5 participant states). A regional anti-tsunamis alert network is being set-up, and should be operational in the near future, and integrated within the global system. Far from being negligible, such realisations are witness to rapid progress in a newfound recognition of marine ecological sensibility across the region.
2.4. ... But much still remains to be doneAn important gap still exists between statements of principle, the will to act, and their actual realisation. A number of states have yet to sign and ratify the Cartagena Convention5 and its protocols (annexes b-c-d). Note also that the number varies greatly from case to case. The effective launch of the STZC has proved rather slow. Should one read here a lack of commitment in some countries to what they consider non-priority problems? Or is it rather a wish not to “tie one hands” by acceding to constraining instruments possibly affecting national interests? Reasons vary, but these non-ratifications, particularly by large states, clearly undermine the impact of these conventions. Only 30% of marine spaces theoretically subject to protection are properly managed, the pace of their listing by far outweighing the putting into place of the corresponding means. In the domain of fishing everything still remains to be done as regards the harmonization of regulations (mesh size of nets, proscribed fishing periods...) or again, the establishment of quotas for over-exploited migratory species. Neither is there an agreed common position concerning whale hunting.
The balance sheet thus appears mitigated, with progress in many areas stalled... The central place unanimously accorded to the sea today was barely in evidence just a few decades ago. Up until the 1980s, the sea remained a marginal space, as much in its representation as in the preoccupations of those post-colonial societies which remained above all land and agriculture-based (even in the islands), which considered themselves little affected by the stakes in question. In recent decades, a profound mental transformation has come about slowly and unequally, but finally quite rapidly, a spectacular turnaround in the way coastal peoples of the Caribbean apprehend “their” sea, and their relationships with it. Over-riding factors of disunity and of physical, cultural, economic, and other cross-regional divisions, the sea has progressively assumed its place in the collective imagination as the smallest common denominator tying together the diverse countries and territories of the region. In short, it represents “the common heritage of the peoples of the Caribbean,” a regional stake that engages everyone, acting as a handy and undeniable anchor of regional identity. Economic stakes and political vision in turn are brought together. Regional policies linked to the sea provide opportunities to represent more clearly and tangibly the collection destiny of the “Caribbean Community.” At the culmination at what appeared as an unpromising start, the progress achieved over recent decades seems remarkable but cannot conceal the persistence of a number of gaps and failures. A real awareness of the issues appears much more evident in the islands, especially the smallest, than in the mainland states where national interests often take precedence over regional solidarities. Convincing arguments still need to be pursued forcefully to ensure the full acceptance of the federating role that the sea provides as the “regional cement,” the engine of a new dynamic in regional development, that is her legitimate inheritance.
Annexes: The Cartagena Convention and its protocols
The signatories of the Special Protocols of Cartagena Conventionb) SPAW Protocol: Specially Protected Areas and Wildlifec) LBS Protocol: Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activitiesd) Oil Spills Protocol: Pollution from oil spills incidents1 AOSIS (Alliance of Small Islands States and low-lying coastal states): Coalition of states particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, who share a common position on climate change and the long-term correcting measures required. Bringing together 43 states and observers from all regions of the world, played a key role in the elaboration of the Kyoto protocol. 2 Cartagena Convention of the Indies, 24 March 1983, echoing the spirit of the recommendations of the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. 3 Description applied to fishing which continues to leave in situ nets, either lost or abandoned, trapping for months or even years both fish and sea mammals, as well as sea birds. 4 Launched at Ramsar, Iran, in 1971. 5 States not having signed or ratified: Bahamas, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname. 6 Following those established in Polynesia, New Caledonia and the Mediterranean. Translation: : Louis Shurmer-Smith top |
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